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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Mangum appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence to a unified 
term of fourteen years, with five years fixed, for forgery of a financial transaction card. 
(R., pp.242-44.) Specifically, Mr. Mangum challenges both the district court's denial of 
his motion to dismiss the criminal information against him based on a violation of the 
interstate agreement on detainers (hereinafter, lAD), as well as the district court's 
refusal to suppress evidence gained from the execution of a search warrant predicated 
on information and observations made by officers' unlawful entry into Mr. Mangum's 
apartment. This case involves consideration of two issues; the first requires a 
determination of what triggers the 180 day speedy trial requirement of the interstate 
agreement on detainers, while the second involves a determination of whether an 
officer's uninvited entry into a defendant's home precludes the State from relying upon 
the officer's observation of items in plain view to obtain a search warrant. 
Mr. Mangum entered a conditional guilty plea to forgery of a financial transaction 
card on August 17, 2010, preserving the right to appeal these issues if the district court 
denied him relief on either ground. (R., pp.204-216; 08/17/00 Tr., p.7, L.13 - p.24, 
L.10.)1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
lAD: On January 12, 2009, Mr. Mangum was charged by criminal complaint with 
two counts of felony grand theft by unauthorized control, stemming from events 
1 Because there are multiple separately bound transcripts in the record on appeal, the 
transcripts will be referenced by the date of the hearing. 
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occurring in Ada County November 7-8, 2008. (R., pp.8-9) At the time the complaint 
was filed, Mr. Mangum was being held in custody in California and a copy of the arrest 
warrant from Idaho, stemming from the complaint, was faxed by Ada County to the 
Orange County Sheriff's Office on June, 7,2009. (R., pp.11-12,37-39.) Upon learning 
of the pending charges, Mr. Mangum wrote letters to the Ada County courts, beginning 
in June and extending through December of 2009, asking to be extradited from 
California to Idaho to resolve his case. (R., pp.11-22, 24-29, 31-32.) Many of these 
letters and requests were forwarded to the Ada County Prosecutor's office, including a 
letter dated June 4, 2009 (R., p.11) and a Notice and demand for trial dated July 3, 
2009. (R., p.19.) In addition, Mr. Mangum's father contacted the Ada County 
Prosecutor's office on Mr. Mangum's behalf and received a return call from a deputy 
prosecuting attorney advising him there was nothing the prosecutor could do to move 
the process along, but that Mr. Mangum could contact the Ada County Sheriff's Office 
and the California Department of Corrections. (Defendant's Exhibit 0, admitted at 
8/3/10 Tr., p.88, L.23-p.89, L.10; 8/10/10 Tr. p. 118, Ls.13-20.) 
A status hearing was held in Mr. Mangum's absence on October 19, 2009. 
(R., p.30.) At the hearing, the deputy prosecuting attorney indicated that Mr. Mangum is 
in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and that the prosecutor had 
been in contact with both the Department of Corrections and Mr. Mangum's public 
defender. (10/19/09 Tr., p.6, Ls.16-23.) The prosecutor related that Mr. Mangum 
"apparently has been given the forms to start the process to get back here," and "[e]very 
couple of days I have been calling the Department corrections [sic], reminding them, 
and they are telling me they are processing that." (10/19/09 Tr., p.6, L.25 - p.7, L.4.) 
The prosecutor indicated that "[o]n our side, we will fill them out, do what we need to do, 
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and get them in ourselves." (10/19/09 Tr., p.7, Ls.5-6.) The district court then summed 
up its understanding of the proceedings thus far: 
So, for the record, the status of the matter is this: That 
Mr. Mangum is in - - formally in the Department of Corrections for 
California's custody. He has apparently been, according to Mr. Dinger, 
given the proper forms for processing this matter under Idaho Code 19-
5001, the interstate compact on detainers, and we anticipate receiving 
additional forms from him. 
In the meantime, the court will have a copy of the letter, the latest 
correspondence from the defendant copied and forwarded to the 
Prosecuting Attorney's office to your attention, Mr. Dinger. 
(10/19/09 Tr., p.8, L.18 - p.9, L.6.) On December 16, 2009, Mr. Mangum filed a notice 
of imprisonment and request for disposition, which was submitted by the prison facility 
where he was being housed in Soledad, California to Ada County prosecutors. 
(R., pp.35-36) Finally, on January 4, 2010, an lAD Evidence of Agents Authority to Act 
for Receiving State, was signed by the Ada County Prosecutor requesting the transport 
of Mr. Mangum from California to Idaho. (R., pp.33-34.) 
Mr. Mangum appeared by video for arraignment on February 5, 2010, he was 
appointed a lawyer and the matter was set for preliminary hearing on February 19, 
2010. (R., pp.40-41.) According to minutes from the February 19th hearing, because the 
public defender had a conflict of interest and new counsel needed to be appointed to 
represent Mr. Mangum, the matter was reset for preliminary hearing on March 4, 2010. 
(R., pp.47-48.) Conflict counsel entered a notice of appearance on February 23, 2010 
and on March 4, 2010, the prosecutor filed an amended complaint alleging one count of 
forgery of a financial transaction card, three counts of criminal possession of a financial 
transaction card, and one count of misappropriation of personal identifying information, 
all felony offenses. (R., pp.49-50, 54-56.) Mr. Mangum was arraigned on the Amended 
Complaint on March 4, 2010 and waived his right to a preliminary hearing. (R., p.57.) 
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A criminal information was filed and the matter was set for arraignment in district court 
on March 16, 2010. (R., pp.58, 62-64.) At the March 16, 2010 hearing, after 
Mr. Mangum refused to waive his right to a speedy trial, a jury trial was scheduled to 
begin May 12, 2010. (R., pp.65-68; 3/16/10 Tr., p.7, Ls.16-24.) 
At the pretrial conference held on April 27, 2010, Mr. Mangum's trial was 
rescheduled for August 9, 2010, to give the parties and the Court time to address 
Mr. Mangum's pretrial motions, including the motion to dismiss under the lAD. (4/27/10 
Tr., p.9, Ls.13-15; p.15, Ls.7-25.) Mr. Mangum declined to waive his right to speedy 
trial. (4/27/10 Tr., p.11, L.17-p.12, L.18.) The Court held hearings on Mr. Mangum's 
Motion to Dismiss2 due to an lAD violation on August 3 and 10, 2010. Subsequently, 
Mr. Mangum entered a conditional guilty plea to forgery of a financial transaction card 
on August 17, 2010, preserving the right to appeal his motion to dismiss if the district 
court denied him relief on that ground. (R., pp.204-216; 08/17/00 Tr., p.7, L.13 - p.24, 
L.10.) The district court then entered an order denying Mr. Mangum's Motion to Dismiss 
under the lAD on September 27,2010, finding Mr. Mangum was given a trial date well 
within the lAD requirements. (R., pp.229-234) 
Entry Into Apartment: On November 10, 2008, investigators with the Idaho 
Lottery Enforcement Division were investigating Roderick Rainger Mangum in 
connection with the theft of lottery tickets and the purchase of gift cards with stolen and 
fictitious credit card numbers, which gift cards were used to buy merchandise, including 
2 Prior to the Motion hearings, Mr. Mangum filed his Motion to Dismiss, the State filed a 
Response, and Mr. Mangum filed a Reply. (R., pp.73-74,78-77, 146-176, 179-183.) After 
the Motion hearings, Mr. Mangum filed Supplemental Argument (R., pp.189-90) and 
both parties submitted a stipulation regarding the evidence that was presented at the 
hearings and the evidence the parties wanted the court to consider. (R., pp.196-197.) 
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lottery tickets. (8/10/10 Tr., p.126, L.6 - p.130, L.2; p.139, L.5-p.140, L.13; Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.2.) During their investigation, Idaho Lottery 
investigators discovered Mr. Mangum had a warrant outstanding for his arrest in 
California and contacted the U.S. Marshal's office to advise them they had a lead on 
Mr. Mangum's whereabouts. (8/10/10 Tr., p.128, L.24 - p.129, L.12.) Officers with the 
U.S. Marshal's office asked Idaho investigators to meet them at the address where it 
was suspected Mr. Mangum was residing. (8/10/10 Tr., p.129, Ls.1-12.) 
Four or five agents met Idaho officers at Mr. Mangum's suspected residence at 
3132 Esquire. (8/10/10 Tr., p.129, Ls.6-12; 8/3/10 Tr., p.31, L.3 - p.32, L.17; 8/3/10 
Tr., p.50, Ls.2-p.51, L.2.) Amber French, Deputy Director of the Enforcement Division 
for the Idaho Lottery, made efforts to verify whether the apartment number they had for 
Mr. Mangum was correct. (8/10/10 Tr., p.130, Ls.7-15.) The first apartment Ms. French 
went to was not Mr. Mangum's apartment, but she was directed to another building in 
the complex across the parking lot. (8/10/10 Tr., p.130, Ls.16-20.) En route to the 
second apartment, Ms. French noticed a man at the dumpster holding a trash bag. 
(8/10/10 Tr., p.130, Ls.20-25.) Ms. French and Detective Hazel, an investigator with the 
Idaho Lottery, were walking across the parking lot together at the time and they both 
suspected the man by the dumpster may be Mr. Mangum. (8/10/10 Tr. p.130 L.23 -
p.131, L.2.) The federal officers did not think the man by the dumpster was 
Mr. Mangum, but chief deputy U.S. Marshal Platt decided to follow the man while 
Ms. French proceeded to the second apartment. (8/10/10 Tr., p.131, Ls.15-24, p.147, 
Ls.8-17.) 
Mr. Platt followed and then approached the man, later identified as Mr. Mangum, 
identified himself as being with the U.S. Marshalls, and asked Mr. Mangum if he was 
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"Derrick." (8/10/10 Tr., p.148, L.s14-19.) Mr. Platt made up the name, which he does 
routinely when looking for fugitives or people with active warrants, to de-escalate the 
situation and put suspects at ease. (8/10/10 Tr., p.159, Ls.2-22.) Mr. Mangum 
responded, "No. My name is Rod." (8/10/10 Tr., p.149, Ls.14-17.) When Mr. Platt told 
Mr. Mangum he needed to see some identification, Mr. Mangum maintained that he was 
not Derrick and he did not have any identification on him. (8/10/10 Tr., p.149, LS.14-
22.) Mr. Platt told Mr. Mangum "[w]ell, let's go in your apartment and get your 10[,]" and 
when Mr. Mangum maintained he was not Derrick, "[w]ell, I'd like to see some 10, and 
then I can prove that you're not Derrick, who we're looking for." (8/10/10 Tr., p.149, 
L.23- p.150, L.5.) They started walking toward Mr. Mangum's apartment, which he 
identified to Mr. Platt as "the one with open door." (8/10/10Tr., p.150, Ls.8-15.) When 
they got to the apartment, Mr. Mangum kept saying "I'm not Derrick that you're looking 
for. But, here, my 10 is on the table here. Let me find my wallet.,,3 (8/10/10 Tr., p.1S1, 
Ls.2-7.) According to Mr. Platt, Mr. Mangum walked into the apartment first and 
Mr. Platt followed. (8/10/10 Tr., p.151, Ls.7-18.) 
According to Ms. French, when she reached Mr. Mangum's apartment (the 
second apartment), the door was open. (8/10/10 Tr, p.132, Ls.1-2.) Ms. French was 
with another officer at the time and decided to knock on the door, announcing that she 
was Amber French and she was from "ABC Realty." (8/10/10 Tr., p.132, Ls.3-7.) After 
announcing her presence, Ms. French noticed there was cable guy in the apartment 
installing cable. (8/10/10 Tr., p.132, Ls.8-9, p.132, Ls.13-14.) About five feet in front of 
3 According to Mr. Platt, as he and Mr. Mangum were walking toward his apartment, 
Mr. Mangum "kept telling me that he's not Derrick. And I kept saying, 'Well, just prove it 
to me, and you can go.'" (8/10/10 Tr., p.154, Is.1-4.) Mr. Platt also testified that 
Mr. Mangum told him, "Let's go back to my apartment and get my license. It's in my 
wallet in my apartment." (8/10/10 Tr., p.160, Ls.10-13.) 
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her inside the apartment, Ms. French noticed a kitchen table with a scanner or printer or 
computer on it, as well as various credit cards. (8/10/10 Tr., p.133, Ls.9-12, p.134, 
Ls.1-17.) Ms. French believed the items on the table could be related to the Lottery 
investigation. (8/10/10 Tr., p.142, Ls.6-13.) 
Ms. French testified that Detective Hazel and the federal officers walked up 
behind her with Mr. Mangum as she was knocking on the door. (8/10/10 Tr., p.133, 
Ls.15-19, p.134, Ls.18-25.) Specifically, Ms. French noticed Detective Hazel, Mr. Platt, 
and Mr. Mangum walking together toward the apartment. (8/10/10 Tr., p.134, Ls.18-25.) 
Ms. French entered the apartment, but did not recall if she was the first person to go 
inside: "when I saw them coming, they - I think we all went in at the - like I stepped in 
front of them. I'm at the door, and they're up behind me. I stepped into the side, I'm 
looking at the cable guy." (8/10/10 Tr., p.134, Ls.17-22.) Ms. French admitted that she 
may have been the first person to enter Mr. Mangum's apartment. (8/10/10 Tr., p.136, 
Ls.21-23.) Mr. Platt testified that Mr. Mangum retrieved his wallet "off the table and 
gives us the 10. And at that point, when he handed me the 10, I arrested him." (8/10/10 
Tr., p.152, Ls.14-17.) Ms. French did not arrest Mr. Mangum, but saw other officers 
take him to the ground, between the door and the kitchen table, inside the apartment. 
(8/10/10 Tr., p.137, Ls.10-18.) 
Mr. Mangum testified. He confirmed the events leading up to his encounter with 
Mr. Platt were consistent with Ms. French's and Mr. Platt's testimony, except 
Mr. Mangum recalled Mr. Platt pulling his weapon when he first approached 
Mr. Mangum and asked if he was Derrick. (8/3/10 Tr., p.51, L.8 - p.53, L.45.) When 
Mr. Mangum denied being Derrick and identified himself as Rod Mangum, Mr. Platt 
advised he needed to confirm that by seeing Mr. Mangum's identification. (8/3/10 
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Tr., p.53, Ls.1-16.) When Mr. Mangum and Mr. Platt arrived at his apartment door, 
Detective Hazel and Ms. French were already there. (8/3/10 Tr., p.53, Ls.17-24.) While 
still outside the apartment, Mr. Mangum again repeated that he was not Derrick, and 
Mr. Platt responded, U[w]e just need your ID. Where is your ID?" (8/3/10 Tr., p.53, L.25 
- p.54, LA.) When Mr. Mangum told Mr. Platt his ID was "right in there" and pushed the 
door open, Mr. Platt again asked where Mr. Mangum's ID was, and Mr. Mangum stated, 
"My wallet is right there." (8/3/10 Tr., p.53, L.21 - p.55, L.5.) Mr. Platt then entered the 
apartment, picked up a gift card off the table, then picked up the wallet after 
Mr. Mangum advised him and the other officers that he wanted them out of his house if 
they did not have a search warrant. (8/3/10 Tr., p.55, L.7 - p.56, L.16.) After 
Mr. Mangum was placed under arrest, before a search warrant had been issued, 
Detective Hazel and Ms. French "searched [his] house." (8/3/10 Tr., p.56, L.12 - p.57, 
L.7.) 
Mr. Mangum filed a motion to suppress evidence discovered during the officers' 
unlawful entry into his apartment. (R., pp.76-77, 148-151.) Hearings on the motion 
were held August 3 and 10, 2010, at which time the court heard testimony from 
Mr. Platt, Ms. French, Mr. Mangum and Boise City police Detective Justin Kendall. 
Subsequently on August 31, 2010, the Court issued a written decision denying 
Mr. Mangum's motion to suppress, concluding Mr. Mangum had impliedly consented to 
the officers' entry into his apartment. (R., pp.218-223.). 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Mangum's motion to dismiss 
based on the State's failure to comply with the lAD's 180 day deadline? 
2. Whether the district court erred in concluding Mr. Mangum impliedly consented to 
law enforcement officers' warrantless entry into his apartment? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Mangum's Motion To Dismiss Based On The 
State's Failure To Comply With The 180 Day Deadline Under The Interstate Agreement 
On Detainers 
A. Introduction 
For more than six months, through a series of letters and one telephone call, 
Mr. Magnum repeatedly asked judges of the Fourth Judicial District Court and Deputy 
Ada County prosecutors to bring him back to Idaho to resolve the pending criminal 
complaint against him. Despite these numerous requests, and despite the fact that a 
fugitive hold from Ada County was placed on Mr. Mangum on May 22, 2009, 
Mr. Mangum was not arraigned on the Ada County charges until February 5, 2010. 
(R., pp.40, 90.) The district court concluded that the timeline of the lAD was not 
triggered until a formal detainer from Idaho was ultimately was lodged in California 
against Mr. Mangum on December 16, 2009 and the formal notice was sent from the 
California facility where Mr. Mangum was being held to the Ada County Prosecutor's 
Office on December 28, 2009 (R., pp. 142-43,167, 233.) Mr. Mangum asserts that the 
district court erred in failing to grant his motion to dismiss because both the prosecutor 
and court had actual notice of Mr. Mangum's filing as early as August 28th , but as late 
as October 19, 2009, and Mr. Mangum substantially complied with the lAD. 
B. The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Mangum's Motion To Dismiss Based On 
The State's Failure To Comply With The 180 Day Deadline Under The lAD 
The district court erred in concluding that Mr. Mangum's right to a speedy trial, as 
guaranteed by the lAD, was not invoked until two events occurred: (1) Idaho lodged a 
formal detainer against Mr. Mangum in California; and (2) Idaho received formal notice 
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from Mr. Mangum, through the California Warden's Office, requesting a speedy trial. 
Based on these findings, the district court concluded that Mr. Mangum's speedy trial 
rights under the lAD were not violated. As articulated below, Mr. Mangum asserts that 
the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. 
The Federal Government, the District of Columbia, and forty-eight (48) states, 
including Idaho, have entered into the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Alabama v. 
Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 148 (2001). The purpose of the lAD is set forth in the text of 
the statute itself. 
The agreement on detainers is hereby enacted into law and entered into 
by this state [Idaho] with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in the 
form substantially as follows: 
(a) The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, 
detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, 
and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated 
in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of 
prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the 
party states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the 
expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination 
of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried 
indictments, informations or complaints. The party states also find that 
proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when 
emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the 
absence of cooperative procedures. It is the further purpose of this 
agreement to provide such cooperative procedures. 
Idaho Code §19-5001 (a). In accordance with this purpose, the lAD creates uniform 
procedures for expeditiously resolving pending charges and detainers against prisoners 
in the party states. Specifically, the lAD provides that once a person 
has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional 
institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the 
term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried 
indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has 
been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within on 
hundred eighty (180) days after he shall have caused to be delivered to 
the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting 
officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his 
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request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or 
complaint[.] 
I.C. §19-5001 (c)(1). Because the lAD is a congressionally sanctioned compact, it falls 
within the purview of the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution; it is a 
federal law subject to federal construction. New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111 (2000); 
United States Constitution, Art. I, §10, c1.3. Both California and Idaho are parties to the 
lAD agreement. I.C. §19-5001 (a); Cal Penal Code §1389 et seq. 
1. The District Court Erred In Concluding That Mr. Mangum's lAD Rights 
Were Not Invoked Until Idaho, The Requesting State, Received Formal 
Notice From California, The Sending State 
After Mr. Mangum's arrest on November 10, 2008, he was transported to 
California and incarcerated in the Orange County Jail pending resolution of the 
California case that gave rise to his arrest. (R., p.11.) At least as of June 10,2009, and 
as late as August 7, 2009, California authorities had no records reflecting a hold from 
the State of Idaho for Mr. Mangum. (R., pp.130,132; Def.Ex.N.) Although Mr. Mangum 
tried to invoke his lAD rights with respect to the Idaho charges on June 15, 2009, he 
was advised by California authorities that he could not do so until he was sentenced in 
California. (R., pp.137,139.) Mr. Mangum was sentenced to serve a prison sentence in 
California on June 30, 2009, and was physically transferred to a prison facility on 
July 22, 2009. (R., pp.93-94, 11 0, 229; 8/3/10 Tr., p.66, L.12 - p.67, LA.) On June 7, 
2009, "T Bellizzi" from Ada County faxed an arrest warrant to "Orange Co. So., Ca." in 
Ada County case CR-FE2009-000744, ordering Mr. Mangum be arrested and held on 
$50,000 bond. (R., pp.37-39.,88-89.) For some reason, the warrant was not 
considered a hold until September 11, 2009, when California Department of Corrections 
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and Rehabilitation recognized the Ada County warrant. (R., p.140.) California did not 
process the warrant until October 23,2009. (R., p.124) 
In addressing Mr. Mangum's lAD challenge, the district court treated the warrant 
as a formal detainer as of September 11, 2009, the date California apparently deemed 
the warrant to be a detainer. (R., pp.140, 230.) The district court relied on testimony 
offered at the August 3, 2010 hearing from Cindy McDonald, the interstate coordinator 
for the Idaho Department of Correction, for its conclusion that a warrant does not 
constitute a detainer. (R., p.230). Ms. McDonald testified that the lAD procedure varies 
from state to state, but that in her experience in Idaho, a hold is placed on an offender 
for tried charges, probation violations, and parole violations. (8/3/10 Tr., p.27, L.16-
p.28, L.9.) According to Ms. McDonald, the hold tells the prison "this agency would like 
to take custody of this individual when they're released. But the paperwork does not fall 
within the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, so they cannot initiate the [lAD] while he's 
[sic] in our custody." (8/3/10 Tr., p.28, Ls.2-9.) Ms. McDonald defined a detainer as "a 
certified information, complaint, or indictment with a request to place a detainer. That's 
how I accept the paperwork for a detainer. And they're for untried charges, felony 
charges." (8/3/10 Tr., p.11, Ls.9-12 (emphasis added).) When the Court asked 
Ms. McDonald what happens when a hold is the result of an arrest warrant on pending 
felony charges, she responded: 
Some agencies will do that. And usually when we place a hold for that, the 
reason we place the hold instead of possibly a detainer is because 
the inmate is going to be paroling within a short period of time or 
discharging his Idaho sentence, and the time frame for the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers is not applicable for placing a detainer against 
him. Because once you place a detainer and the person goes to the other 
jurisdiction, they go to the receiving state. Once they're finished with all of 
their charges, they have to be sent back to the sending state. 
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If they're paroling or they're discharging, we don't want them back. 
So that's why occasionally, if it's untried charges, we'll place a hold 
because there's imminent release from prison. 
(8/3/10 Tr., p.28, L.21 - p.29, L.11 (emphasis added).) Thus, Ms. McDonald's 
testimony seems to be that warrants based on untried felony charges can be 
considered detainers, depending on the length of the remaining prison sentence. 
The United States Supreme Court has implicitly recognized that documents other 
than those explicitly labeled "detainers" may trigger the protection of the lAD. In United 
States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 349 (1978), the Supreme Court considered whether the 
lAD is triggered when the United States uses the writ of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum (hereinafter, Writ) to obtain custody of state prisoners. The Court noted 
the Writ, including its historical role and function, "bear little resemblance to the typical 
detainer which activates the provisions of the [lAD] Agreement." Id. at 357. 
In distinguishing the Writ from an lAD detainer, the Court recognized the 
following characteristics of a detainer: (1) it can be lodged against a prisoner at the 
behest of the prosecutor or law enforcement officer without judicial review; (2) it does 
not require the immediate presence of a prisoner but instead serves to put institution 
officials on notice that a prisoner is wanted by another jurisdiction "upon his release 
from prison"; and (3) further action is required by the receiving State to obtain the 
prisoner. Id. at 358. Although the lAD does not define a detainer, House and Senate 
reports relating to the lAD explain the detainer is "a notification filed with the institution 
in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending 
criminal charges in another jurisdiction." Id. at 359 (citations omitted). In contrast, Writs 
are immediately executed, they are issued by a federal court, and they have a long 
history dating back to the first judiciary act. Id. at 360-61. Given these differences, the 
14 
problems the lAD sought to eliminate do not arise with the Writ. Thus, the Court held 
that a Writ is not a detainer for purposes of the lAD. Id. at 361. 
For the same reasons the Mauro Court found the Writ was not a detainer for lAD 
purposes, a warrant is a detainer for lAD purposes; it can be lodged against a prisoner 
at the behest of the prosecutor or a law enforcement officer; it does not require the 
immediate presence of a prisoner but instead puts institution officials on notice that a 
prisoner is wanted by another jurisdiction "upon his release from prison"; and finally, 
additional action is required before the receiving State can obtain the prisoner. Id. at 
358. The warrant and the detainer are thus indistinguishable in their effect for lAD 
purposes. 
This point was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Carchman v. 
Nash, 473 U.S. 716,727 (1985). In Carchman, the Court determined the plain language 
of the lAD, as well as its legislative history, reflected that the lAD was intended only to 
apply to detainers premised on untried indictments, informations or complaints, thereby 
excluding detainers based on probation violations. Id. at 726-27. In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court cited to the lAD drafters' definition of a detainer under the lAD: "A 
detainer may be defined as a warrant filed against a person already in custody with the 
purposes of insuring that he will be available to the authority which has placed the 
detainer." Id. at 727 (quoting Suggested State Legislation, Program for 1957, p.74). 
While agreeing with this definition and the fact that a detainer could arise from parole or 
probation violations, the Court determined that by its own terms, the lAD did not apply to 
all detainers, only those arising from untried indictments, informations or complaints. Id. 
The warrant in Mr. Mangum's case was signed by the magistrate after receiving 
a complaint, under oath, from the deputy prosecutor, alleging Mr. Mangum committed 
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two counts of felony grand theft by unauthorized control, in violation of I.C. §§ 1B-
2403(3), 1B-2407(1)(b). (R., pp.BB-B9.) By its own terms, the warrant gave notice that it 
was premised on an untried complaint against Mr. Mangum for two felony grand theft 
counts. See Pyzer v. State, 109 Idaho 376 (Ct. App. 1985) (a warrant and request for 
extradition may constitute a detainer under I.C. §19-5001); cf State v. Smith, 119 Idaho 
11, 12 (Ct. App. 1990) (where defendant failed to establish a warrant for extradition was 
issued and served on Wyoming authorities demanding his appearance in Idaho, 
defendant's wavier of extradition did not trigger the lAD). 
As a result, the district court erred in considering the date California began 
treating the warrant as a detainer to be the date of the detainer; instead, the date of the 
detainer is the date Mr. Mangum had a warrant outstanding against him in Idaho (Ada 
County), and was serving a sentence in a state prison: July 22, 2009. See I.C. §19-
5001 (c)(1) (once a person "has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or 
correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term 
of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, 
information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the 
prisoner .... "); Brewer v. State, 128 Idaho 340, 343 (Ct. App.1996) (defendant became 
eligible for protections under the lAD only upon being placed in prison, but not while in 
county jail); State v. Breen, 126 Idaho 305, 308 (Ct. App. 1994) ("[T]he I.A.D. governs 
only when the defendant is serving a sentence in prison."). For these reasons, much 
like a prematurely filed notice of appeal (Idaho Appellate Rule 17; Weller v. State, 146 
Idaho 652, 653-54 (Ct. App. 200B)), the warrant should be treated as a ripe, or 
perfected detainer, as of the date Mr. Mangum began serving his prison sentence in 
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California: July 22, 2009.4 (R., pp.37-39.,88-89, 122; 8/3/10 Mot. Hrg. Tr., p.66, L.12 -
p.67, L.4.) 
2. The District Court Erred In Concluding That Mr. Mangum's lAD Rights 
Were Not Triggered Until The Prosecutor Received Formal Notice Of 
Mr. Mangum's Disposition Request 
Although a detainer is a necessary predicate for application of the lAD, the 180 
day speedy trial right is not triggered until the prosecuting attorney and appropriate 
court receive notice of an inmate's request for final disposition of the pending charges. 
I.C. § 19-5001 (c)(1). The district court concluded that despite Mr. Mangum's written 
requests to the district court and Ada County prosecutor's office, the lAD's 180 day 
speedy trial right was not triggered until the Ada County prosecutor received formal 
notice of Mr. Mangum's request to resolve the pending charges from the California 
Warden's office on December 28, 2009. (R., pp.167, 233.) 
As previously noted, the lAD requires that when a person serving a prison 
sentence has an 
untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a 
detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial 
within one hundred eighty (180) days after he shall have caused to be 
delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the 
prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his 
imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the 
indictment, information or complaint[.] . .. The request of the prisoner 
shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having 
custody of the prisoner, stating the term of the commitment under which 
the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to 
be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of 
parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole 
agency relating to the prisoner. 
4 Mr. Mangum was received by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation on 
July 22, 2009, at the Wasco State Prison. (R., p.122) He was later transferred to 
another California prison, the Correctional Training Facility, on October 19, 2009. 
(R., p.124.) 
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I.C. § 19-5001 (c)(1). 
Here, it is undisputed that Mr. Mangum sent numerous letters to the appropriate 
court and the Ada County prosecutor's office asking for a speedy trial and invoking the 
lAD. (R., pp.229-30.) It is also undisputed that Mr. Mangum invoked his constitutional 
right to a speedy trial and could do so by these written requests. See, e.g., Smith v 
Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383 (1969) (upon a defendant's demand, states have a 
constitutional duty to make a good faith, diligent effort to bring the defendant to trial). 
Mr. Mangum testified and the State did not dispute that while he was in custody 
in California, first in the Orange County Jail and then later the Wasco State Prison and 
the Soledad Correctional Training Facility, he sent a number of letters, some certified, to 
both the court and the prosecutor's office seeking resolution of the pending Idaho 
charges. (8/3/10 Tr. p.57, L.15 - p.67, L.4; R., pp.95-109.) Mr. Mangum completed a 
"notice and demand for trial," which he addressed to the Ada County prosecutor's office, 
identifying his location in Wasco State Prison for the offense of commercial burglary, 
identifying the charge pending against him in Idaho, including the warrant number and 
County; Mr. Mangum submitted proof of service of the notice, which was mailed on 
August 21,2009 and received by the Court on August 28,2009. (R., pp.110-111.) 
These documents were mailed by Mr. Mangum, while he was in prison, to the 
prosecutor's office and were also routed by the court to the prosecutor's office on 
September 1, 2009. (R., pp.95-1 00,111.) At a status hearing held in Mr. Mangum's 
absence on October 19, 2009, Mr. Dinger, an Ada County Deputy Prosecutor was 
present and the issues of the detainer, Mr. Mangum's custody status, and the State's 
and the court's knowledge of these issues were addressed. (R., p.30; 10/19/09 Tr., p.6, 
L.25 - p.7, L.4 (Mr. Dinger informing the Court that Mr. Mangum is in the custody of the 
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California Department of Corrections and that he (Mr. Dinger) had been in contact with 
both the Department of Corrections and Mr. Mangum's public defender).) 
Thus, as early as August 28th , but as late as October 19, 2009, both the court 
and the prosecutor's office had all of the information necessary under the lAD to 
address Mr. Mangum's request to have his Ada County charges resolved. Moreover, 
the negative effects of the detainer were felt by Mr. Mangum on October 23, 2009, when 
he was removed from general population and placed in Administrative Segregation 
based solely on the Ada County warrant. (Defendant's Exhs. J-K.) 
The requirements necessary for a prisoner to invoke the protections of the lAD 
include: (1) a written detainer; (2) written notice to the appropriate court of the 
prosecuting officer's jurisdiction of the place of the prisoner's incarceration; (3) a request 
for a final disposition of the pending indictment, information or complaint; (4) a certificate 
of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner stating the term of the 
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time 
remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of 
parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to 
the prisoner. Idaho Code §19-5001(c)(1). One of the primary purposes of passage of 
the lAD was to minimize the adverse effects detainers had upon prisoners: "[b]ecause a 
detainer remains lodged against a prisoner without any action being taken on it, he is 
denied certain privileges within the prison, and rehabilitation efforts may be frustrated." 
United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 360 (1978). In so seeking to achieve the lAD's 
intended purpose, the Idaho Legislature instructed the reviewing court that "This 
agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purpose." Idaho 
Code § 19-5001 (i) 
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As discussed above, a written detainer was issued for Mr. Mangum. Thereafter, 
through his written notices to the Fourth Judicial District Court, Ada County, and written 
notices to the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's office, Mr. Mangum identified his 
place of confinement, including an address, and requested final disposition of the 
pending complaint against him, even including the correct case number. While this 
information was submitted by Mr. Mangum, not the California Warden's office, proper 
information was conveyed to the correct parties. The State did not claim it lacked notice 
that Mr. Mangum wanted to resolve the Ada County charges, that it had no idea where 
Mr. Mangum was being held in prison in California, the length of his California prison 
sentence, his parole eligibility, or good time/credit for time served; rather the State only 
claimed that it lacked receipt of proper forms, which it received December 28, 2009. 
(R., pp.172-176.) 
In Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43 (1993), the United States Supreme Court 
considered whether the 180 day time period under the lAD is triggered by the date the 
inmate's request for disposition is received by the prosecutor in the receiving state, or 
the date the request for disposition is received by the warden in the sending state. In 
Fex, the petitioner was serving a sentence in an Indiana prison when he received notice 
of a detainer lodged by Michigan. Id. at 46. He gave Indiana prison officials a request 
for final disposition of the Michigan charges on September 7, 1988, and the prison 
mailed the request on September 22. Id. The request was received by the Michigan 
court and prosecutor on September 26, and the petitioner was brought to trial on March 
22, 1989, 177 days after his request was received by Michigan officials, but 196 days 
after his request was delivered to Indiana prison official. Id. The petitioner claimed the 
180 day time period under the lAD was triggered when he delivered his request for 
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disposition to prison officials, not the day the request was received by Michigan officials, 
and moved to dismiss the Michigan charges based on a violation of the lAD. Id. 
The outcome of the Petitioner's claim was contingent upon interpretation of the 
following language in the lAD: "within one hundred and eighty days after he shall have 
caused to be delivered." Id. at 47. The Court first rejected outright the petitioner's 
contention that mere transmittal of the lAD request to prison authorities commences the 
180 day period, irrespective of whether the request is ever received by the receiving 
State. Id. at 47-48. The Court then considered the more difficult question of whether 
the 180 day period must be computed from the date the request is transmitted to prison 
authorities, or from the date when delivery is actually made to the receiving State, Id. at 
48. 
The Court rejected the former interpretation, noting that it was "more reasonable 
to think that the receiving State's prosecutors are in no risk of losing their case until they 
have been informed of the request for trial." Id. at 50. The Court relied on other 
portions of the lAD for its conclusion "that the receiving State's receipt of the request 
starts the clock." Id. at 51. Most significant for the Court was the lAD's provision 
requiring the Warden to forward the request "by registered or certified mail, return 
receipt requested." Id. The Court found it particularly compelling that the lAD provides 
for documentary evidence of the date the request is delivered to officials in the receiving 
State, but provides no such record for proving the date on which a prisoner transmits 
the request to prison officials. Id. The Court thus held the 180 day time period under 
the lAD "does not commence until the prisoner's request for final disposition of the 
charges against him has actually been delivered to the court and prosecuting officer of 
the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer against him." Id. at 52. The decision in Fex 
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emphasizes the importance of the court and prosecutor in a receiving State that issues 
a detainer against a prisoner receiving actual notice of the request for disposition under 
the lAD. 
A review of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of lAD is also instructive. See 
State v. Johnson, 196 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 1999). The Johnson Court was concerned 
with whether a letter, sent to the district court by the prisoner's public defender notifying 
the court of Johnson's invocation of his lAD right, substantially complied with the 
"written notice" of lAD. Id. 196 F.3d at 1004. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the letter 
satisfied the requirements under lAD as it was "undisputed that the public defender's 
letter to the court contained the information required by the lAD to be conveyed to the 
district court, for the letter expressly stated that Johnson was serving a sentence in the 
state of Washington and that he requested a speedy trial. Id. Likewise, in United 
States v. Berg,S the prisoner, Berg, had mailed a letter, entitled "Demand for Speedy 
Trial," which referenced the lAD, to both the prosecuting U.S. Assistant Attorney and 
court. Id. at 1. A few months later, Berg mailed a second "Demand for Speedy Trial" to 
the prosecutor and the court. Id. In both filings Berg "listed his address as the New 
Mexico Department of Corrections in Clayton, New Mexico and demanded that there be 
timely disposition of the pending federal charge pursuant to the lAD." Id. The Court 
concluded that Berg's filing substantially complied with lAD: 
it seems clear that the defendant's demands for a speedy trial 
substantially complied with the information required under the lAD. Both of 
the filings sent to the court and the U.S. Attorney's office were captioned 
with his name and the correct case number and were titled "DEMAND 
FOR SPEEDY TRIAL." ... They expressly stated that the defendant was 
requesting a speedy trial under the lAD. In the second letter dated 
January 11, 2011, he also indicated that he was "sentenced and in 
custody." 
5 U.S. v. Berg, 2011 WL 3471216 (D. Guam 2011). 
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Id. at 4. 
Here, like in Johnson and Berg, there is no question the proper court and the 
proper prosecuting agency that had lodged the detainer against Mr. Mangum received 
actual notice of Mr. Mangum's request for disposition as of August 28, 2009, which is 
confirmed by certified mail receipts, and that Mr. Mangum substantially complied with 
the lAD. (R., pp.95-101.) Moreover, both the court's and the prosecutor's actual notice 
and knowledge of the request for disposition is clear from a review of the transcript of 
the hearing held in Mr. Mangum's absence before Magistrate Judge Hicks on 
October 19, 2009. (See 10/19/09 Tr., p.6, L.16 - p.?, L.4.) In fact, at the hearing the 
deputy prosecutor acknowledged that he had been in contact with the California 
Department of Corrections and Mr. Mangum's California Public Defender and that 
Mr. Mangum "has been in the custody of the Department of Corrections there for a 
couple weeks now .... " (10/19/09 Tr., p.6, L.16 - p.8, L.17.) 
Indeed, no one appears to dispute that both the court and the prosecutor's office 
had actual knowledge and notice of both the detainer and Mr. Mangum's repeated 
requests for speedy resolution of the pending charges. The Idaho Legislature has 
mandated that the lAD "shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purpose." 
Idaho Code § 19-5001(i). It would subvert the purpose of the lAD if the agency which 
issued the detainer and received actual notice of an inmate's desire to resolve the 
detainer were allowed to claim ignorance until receiving formal notice of the inmate's 
request for final disposition. This is precisely what the prosecutor asked and precisely 
what the district court ordered. The district treated December 28, 2009, the date the 
Ada County Prosecutor's office received formal notice from the California Warden of 
Mr. Mangum's formal request to initiate proceedings under the lAD, as the triggering 
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date for the 180 day deadline. (R., pp.167, 233.) As such, the district court erred 
finding that a lAD was not triggered until a formal detainer from Idaho was ultimately 
was lodged in California against Mr. Mangum on December 16, 2009 and the formal 
notice was sent from the California facility where Mr. Mangum was being held because 
Mr. Mangum had provided actual notice to both the court and prosecutor of his intent to 
invoke the provisions of I.C. § 19-5001. 
3. Mr. Mangun Substantially Complied With The Certificate Of Status Of 
Inmate Requirement Of I.C. § 19-5001 
As set forth above, I.C. § 19-5001 (c)(1) provides: 
The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the 
appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of the 
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already 
served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of 
good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any 
decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. 
I.C. § 19-5001 (c)(1). The purpose of the certificate of status is to "allow[] the 
prosecutor to make a rational decision whether to prosecute and the State may, for 
example, decline to prosecute upon learning the prisoner is already serving a lengthy 
sentence elsewhere on a more serious charge." State v.' Moe, 581 N.W.2d 468, 471-
472 (N.D. 1998). Both the Ninth Circuit and the Idaho Legislature mandate that the lAD 
statute must be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose. See State v. Johnson, 196 
F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 1999); Idaho Code § 19-5001(i). Thus, the question before this 
Court is whether Mr. Mangum substantially complied with I.C. § 19-5001. 
Mr. Mangum asserts that he substantially complied with I.C. § 19-5001 (c)(1) as 
he provided all of the information needed for the prosecutor to make a decision to 
prosecutor his case, i.e. his term of the commitment, the time he has already served, 
the time remaining to be served on the sentence, his good time credit, and his 
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approximate parole eligibility date. (See R., pp.11-15.) Idaho courts have not yet 
addressed this issue so we must look to other jurisdictions for guidance. See U. S. v. 
Berg, 2011 WL 3471216 (D. Guam 2011); United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180 (3rd Cir. 
1998); State V. Roberts, 427 SO.2d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. (1983); State V. Smith, 858 
F.2d 416 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993). In Dent, the defendant sent a letter to the federal district 
court in Pennsylvania requesting a speedy resolution of his outstanding federal charges 
while incarcerated in New York State on unrelated charges. Id. 149 F.3d at 183, 186. 
Dent's letter identified his current place of incarceration, but did not reference the lAD or 
include the information which must accompany the request. Id. at 186. Dent argued 
that his letter invoked the lAD and that the "government already possessed most of the 
necessary information concerning his case and his noncompliance was solely the fault 
of the New York state penal authorities." Id. In finding that Dent did not substantially 
comply with the lAD requirements, the Court observed that "Dent's letter did not include 
his term of confinement, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on his 
sentence, or any information concerning good-time credits or parole eligibility as 
required by Article III." Id. at 187. 
In Smith, the defendant, while incarcerated in Texas, sent a letter to New Mexico 
authorities attempting to invoke lAD. Id. 858 P.2d at 417-420. Smith's letter gave 
authorities notice of his prior incarceration in Texas and unlike the defendant in Dent, 
expressly requested lAD processing. Id. at 420. Smith argued that his letter provided 
New Mexico authorities of "actual notice" sufficient to trigger the time requirements of 
lAD. Id. The Smith Court held that although Smith did not have to provide the actual 
certificate inmate statute to substantially comply with lAD, "he did have an obligation to 
furnish the information that would be contained therein." Id. Similarly, in State V. 
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Roberts, supra, the Florida District Court of Appeal held the defendant, Roberts, was 
entitled to lAD relief even though he did not provide authorities with a formal certificate 
of inmate statute because he submitted a memorandum that stated his "jail credit time, 
a conditional early release date, a maximum incarceration date and a parole eligibility 
date." Id. at 789-790. The Roberls Court observed, "If a prisoner makes a good faith 
effort to bring himself within the Agreement's operation, and omits nothing essential to 
the Agreement's operation, then his failure of strict compliance will not deprive him of its 
benefits." Id. at 790 (quoting State ex reI. Saxton v. Moore, 598 S.W.2d 586, 590 
(Mo. App. 1980), see also U.S. v. Berg, 2011 WL 3471216 (D. Guam 2011) (finding that 
the defendant had substantially complied with the certificate of inmate status 
requirement by demanding a speedy resolution of his pending federal charge and 
providing the address of the New Mexico Department of Corrections where he was 
currently serving his sentence.) 
In the instant case, in additional to providing actual notice to both the court and 
prosecuting attorney of his request to invoke the lAD, Mr. Mangum provided authorities 
with his California case number (08CF-2945), his term of the commitment (5 years), the 
time he has already served (233 days), the time remaining to be served on the 
sentence, his good time credit (116 days), and his approximate parole eligibility date 
(August of 2012). (R., pp.11-15.) Additionally, at least as of October 19, 2009, the 
prosecutor was well aware of Mr. Mangum's location and been in contact with both the 
California Department of Corrections and Mr. Mangum's California attorney. (10/9/09 
Tr., p.6, L.16 - p.8, L.17.) It is also apparent that the Ada County Deputy Prosecutor 
had also decided that Mr. Mangum's case was going to be prosecuted as evidenced by 
his statements to the court on October 19, 2009. (10/9/09 Tr., p.8, Ls.12-18 (stating 
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that California has "given him the forms that he needs to fill out to get this going, and so 
we are just waiting to receive those so we can do what we can from out end.".) 
Given Mr. Mangum's substantial compliance with the lAD, as well as both the 
prosecutor's and the court's actual knowledge of Mr. Mangum's desire to resolve the 
outstanding detainer, the triggering date for the 180 day time limit should commence on 
the date Mr. Mangum's request for disposition were received by to the Ada County 
Prosecutor's office and the Ada County Court Clerk's office, as evidenced by the 
certified mail receipts: August 28, 2009. As of this date, Mr. Mangum was incarcerated 
in a California prison; he had provided the prosecutor's office and the court clerk's office 
with all relevant and necessary information under the lAD to permit the State to secure 
his return to Idaho. 
The State's failure to bring Mr. Mangum to trial by February 24,2010, 180 days 
after receipt of Mr. Mangum's request for disposition, requires dismissal of the charges 
in the instant matter with prejudice. Even assuming Mr. Mangum's request that the 
district court consider his motions to dismiss and suppress tolled the 180 day period, 
because this request happened long after the 180 day period had already expired, the 
district court erred in concluding that Mr. Mangum received a trial date within the 180 
day period, that any delays beyond that period were attributable to him, and as a result, 
his rights under the lAD were not violated. 
Mr. Mangum asks this Court to vacate the district court's order denying his 
motion to dismiss and remand his case to the district court for the entry of an order 
dismissing the instant matter with prejudice. I.C. § 19-5001. In the event this Court 
does not order dismissal of Mr. Mangum's case based on a violation of the lAD, 
because the district court erred in denying Mr. Mangum's motion to suppress evidence 
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that was gained as a result of officers' unlawful entry into his apartment, this Court 
should reverse the district court's order denying the motion to suppress and remand 
Mr. Mangum's case for further proceedings. 
II. 
The District Court Erred In Concluding Mr. Mangum Impliedly Consented To Officers' 
Entry Into His Apartment 
A. Introduction 
Observations made by law enforcement officers who arrested Mr. Mangum in his 
apartment provided probable cause for the issuance of a warrant to search 
Mr. Mangum's apartment, which in turn formed the basis for the charges against 
Mr. Mangum in the instant matter. The officers' entry into the apartment was without 
Mr. Mangum's consent and was thus unlawful, rendering the officers' observations a 
product of an unlawful entry and presence. The district court's denial of Mr. Mangum's 
Motion to Suppress based on its conclusion that Mr. Mangum impliedly consented to the 
entry is erroneous and contrary to the evidence. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, 
Idaho appel/ate courts defer to the trial court's factual findings which are not clearly 
erroneous; factual findings supported by substantial competent evidence are not clearly 
erroneous. State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 485 (2007) (citing State v. Klingler, 143 
Idaho 494, 495-96 (2006)); State v. Araiza, 147 Idaho 371, 374 (Ct. App. 2009). 
However, a trial court's legal conclusions and whether constitutional requirements have 
been satisfied based on the facts found are freely reviewed. Id. 
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C. The District Court Erred In Concluding Mr. Mangum Impliedly Consented To 
Officers Entry Into His Apartment 
Mr. Mangum neither expressly nor impliedly consented to law enforcement 
officers' entry into his apartment. As such, all evidence gained as a result of that 
unlawful entry, including any observations of items in plain view, must be suppressed. 
The district court's conclusion that by his words and conduct, Mr. Mangum impliedly 
consented to the officers' entry is not supported by substantial evidence and is thus 
clearly erroneous. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution demands "[t]he right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]" U.S. Const. amend IV. 
Warrantless searches and seizure are presumptively unreasonable. State v. Anderson, 
140 Idaho 484,486 (2004). While it is true that numerous exceptions have been carved 
out to permit both warrantless seizures and searches, the State bears the burden of 
proving a warrantless search or seizure falls within a well-established exception to the 
warrant requirement. State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482,485 (2007). 
Evidence found in plain view is an exception to the warrant requirement. 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971). The plain view exception to the 
warrant requirement must meet specific standards to be applicable. An officer must be 
in a place he or she is lawfully entitled to be at the time the item in plain view is 
observed, and the evidentiary value or illegal nature of the item observed must be 
immediately apparent. Id. at 466; see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) 
(dispensing with inadvertence requirement of discovery of item in plain view, but 
otherwise affirming plain view exception announced in Coolidge). 
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Consent is also a well-established exception to the warrant requirement. Smith, 
144 Idaho at 488. The State bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of 
the evidence that consent was voluntarily given, rather than the product of duress or 
coercion, direct or implied. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 221 (1973); 
State v. Jaborrra, 143 Idaho 94,97 (Ct. App. 1994). The voluntariness of consent must 
be assessed by consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
consent. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194,201 (2002). Consent may be granted 
explicitly by words, or implicitly by gestures or conduct. State v. Moran-Soto, 150 Idaho 
175,180 (Ct. App. 2010) (citations omitted). However, acquiescence to a claim of lawful 
authority is not consent and does not satisfy the state's burden of showing that consent 
has been freely and voluntarily given. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). 
Here the district court concluded that Mr. Mangum impliedly consented to officers 
entering his apartment by telling officers "let's go back to my apartment to get my 
license." (R., p.222.) The district court discounted the fact that officers escorted 
Mr. Mangum back to his apartment, and found it was reasonable for Mr. Platts to 
believe Mr. Mangum was cooperative and therefore consenting, because it was in 
Mr. Mangum's "best interest to get identification to prove his identity to the officers." 
(R., p.222.) The finding of consent rendered the officer's observation of items of 
possible evidentiary value in plain view lawful. (R., p.223.) The district court's analysis 
fails to consider the full testimony of Marshal Platts, Ms. French, Mr. Mangum and 
Justin Kendall. 
As previously noted, Mr. Platt testified that when he told Mr. Mangum he needed 
to see some identification, Mr. Mangum maintained that he was not Derrick and he did 
not have any identification on him. (8/10/10 Tr., p.149, Ls.14-22.) Mr. Platt responded 
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by telling Mr. Mangum "[w]ell, let's go in your apartment and get your 10[,]' and when 
Mr. Mangum maintained he was not Derrick, "[w]el/, I'd like to see some 10, and then I 
can prove that you're not Derrick, who we're looking for." (8/10/10 Tr., p.149, L.23-
p.150, L.5 (emphasis added).) According to Mr. Platt, as he and Mr. Mangum were 
walking toward his apartment, Mr. Mangum "kept telling me that he's not Derrick. And I 
kept saying, 'Well, just prove it to me, and you can go.'" (8/10/10 Tr., p.154, Is.1-4 
(emphasis added).) Mr. Platt tried to put a better spin on the events later in his 
testimony, claiming Mr. Mangum told him, "Let's go back to my apartment and get my 
license. It's in my wallet in my apartment[,]" (8/10/10 Tr., p.160, Ls.10-13), and ''I'm not 
Derrick that you're looking for. But, here, my ID is on the table here. Let me find my 
wallet." (8/10/10 Tr., p.151, Ls.2-7.) According to Mr. Platt, Mr. Mangum walked into 
the apartment first and Mr. Platt followed. (8/10/10 Tr., p.151, Ls. 7 -18.) 
According to Ms. French, when she reached Mr. Mangum's apartment, the door 
was open. (8/10/10 Tr, p.132, Ls.1-2.) Ms. French was with another officer at the time 
and decided to knock on the door, announcing that she was Amber French and she was 
from "ABC Realty." (8/10/10 Tr., p.132, Ls.3-7.) According to Ms. French, Detective 
Hazel and the federal officers walked up behind her with Mr. Mangum as she was 
knocking on the door. (8/10/10 Tr., p.133, Ls.15-19; p.134, Ls.18-25.) Specifically, 
Ms. French noticed Detective Hazel, Mr. Platt, and Mr. Mangum walking together 
toward the apartment. (8/10/10 Tr., p.134, Ls.18-25.) Ms. French entered the 
apartment, but did not recall if she was the first person to go inside: "when I saw them 
coming, they - I think we all went in at the - like I stepped in front of them. I'm at the 
door, and they're up behind me. I stepped into the side, I'm looking at the cable guy." 
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(8/10/10 Tr., p.134, Ls.17-22.) Ms. French admitted that she may have been the first 
person to enter Mr. Mangum's apartment. (8/10/10 Tr., p.136, Ls.21-23.) 
Considering the totality of the circumstances, looking only at the testimony of 
Ms. French and Mr. Platt, the State did not establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Mr. Mangum voluntarily consented to the officers' entry into his 
apartment. Ms. French's testimony, coupled with that of Mr. Platt, reflects that 
Mr. Mangum was surrounded by at least three law enforcement officers by the time he 
reached the threshold of his apartment. In addition, Ms. French testified that she may 
have entered Mr. Mangum's apartment first and she did not testify that she had his 
consent to do so. Finally, Mr. Platt's own testimony demonstrates that he told 
Mr. Mangum he had to prove he was who he said he was by showing Mr. Platt his 
identification before Mr. Platt would let Mr. Mangum go; Mr. Platt also made it clear he 
would not take no for an answer and would not accept anything short of seeing 
Mr. Mangum's identification as proof of his identity. 
In addition, taking into account Mr. Mangum's testimony further demonstrates 
that Mr. Mangum did not consent to the officers' entry into his apartment, either implicitly 
or explicitly. Mr. Mangum testified that Mr. Platt initially drew his weapon, asked for 
Mr. Mangum's name, and then advised Mr. Mangum if he was who he said he was, 
everything would be fine. (8/3/10 Tr., p.52, L.8-p.53, L.16.) Mr. Platt escorted 
Mr. Mangum back to his apartment and continued to insist on seeing Mr. Mangum's 
identification, despite Mr. Mangum's protestations that he was not "Derrick." (8/3/10 
Tr., p.53, L.12 -p.54, L.25.) When they reached the apartment, Mr. Platt entered while 
Mr. Mangum was still outside, picked items up off the kitchen table and asked 
Mr. Mangum about them, and then pulled Mr. Mangum's identification out of his wallet 
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and placed him under arrest. (8/3/10 Tr., p.55, 1.7-p.56, L.16.) The district court did not 
discount Mr. Mangum's recitation of events and did not deem his testimony to lack 
credibility. (R., p.223.) 
Mr. Mangum's acquiescence to the officers' apparent authority does not 
constitute voluntarily consent. Mr. Mangum did not consent to the officers' warrantless 
entry into his apartment. Thus, officers were not lawfully entitled to be where they were 
at when they observed the items in "plain view" which provided the basis for the search 
warrant of Mr. Mangum's apartment. (8/3/10 Tr., p.45, Ls.1 0-15 (Testimony from Boise 
City Detective Justin Kendall that he could not see items on the kitchen table from 
outside of the apartment through the open front door).) Accordingly, the district court 
erred in denying his motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Mangum respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
denying his motion to dismiss and remand his case to the district court for the entry of 
an order dismissing the instant matter with prejudice. Alternatively, Mr. Mangum asks 
that this Court vacate the district court's order denying his motion to suppress and 
remand his case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 20th day of December, 2011. 
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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